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Altering the Deal: The Importance of GSE 
Shareholder Litigation 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“I am altering the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further.”1 Ever 
the classical villain, the Star Wars saga’s Darth Vader informs Lando 
Calrissian that the princess and the Chewbacca are now his.2 The lesson 
gleaned from the short exchange is simple: Deals struck with despots  
are not deals at all. Darth Vader’s words likely resonate in the ears of 
private investors in the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie 
Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie 
Mac”), (collectively, the “GSEs”).3 Perry Capital LLC (“Perry”) and 
other private investors in the GSEs are currently embroiled in a legal 
battle against the federal government in connection with the 
conservatorship of the GSEs.4 Their claims, in essence, are that  
agencies of the federal government have impermissibly decided to “alter 
the deal,” and that the deal should be undone.5 
Now on appeal after being dismissed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia,6 Perry’s lawsuit against the 
 
1. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1982). 
2. Id. 
3. The term “Government Sponsored Enterprises,” or “GSEs,” may refer to other 
companies “born from statutory charters issued by Congress,” such as the Federal Home 
Loan Bank. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014). For the purposes of this Note, the term “GSEs” will refer to Fannie Mae  
and Freddie Mac exclusively. 
4. See Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Investors Lose Suits 
Over Lost Dividends, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac-investor-suits-over- 
treasury-dividend-thrown-out.html (noting Perry’s suit is “among . . . almost 20 related  
cases . . . filed by investors”). 
5. See Nathan Vardi, Why Hedge Funds Suing the Government over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac Have a Bad Case, FORBES (July 15, 2013, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/07/15/why-hedge-funds-suing-the- 
government-over-Fannie Mae-and-Freddie Mac-have-a-bad-case; Complaint and Prayer for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 16, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. 
July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint] (noting that the plaintiff “seeks to prevent Defendants 
from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment”). 
6. Notice of Appeal, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2014). 
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United States Treasury (the “Treasury”) and the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (the “FHFA”), (collectively, the “Government”) is but 
one example of current litigation brought by private investors in 
connection with the GSEs.7 These cases, sometimes referred to 
collectively as “dividend sweep litigation,”8 stem from a 2012 
amendment (the “Third Amendment”) to the Senior Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreements (“PSPAs”).9 The plaintiffs in these cases 
challenge the validity of the Third Amendment because, they claim, the 
changes it wrought to the PSPAs negatively impact the value of private 
stock in the GSEs.10 
Perry’s suit in district court against the FHFA and the Treasury 
specifically focused on administrative law arguments against the 
enforcement of the Third Amendment to the PSPAs.11 Perry relied 
almost entirely on alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”)12 to seek the nullification of the Third Amendment.13 As 
presaged in dicta of the district court’s opinion,14 the climate  in which 
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”)15 was 
passed and the broad discretion it affords the FHFA when acting as 
conservator renders these claims difficult to make. 
It is the overarching goal of this Note to provide a broad 
framework  for  understanding  the  issues  at  stake  in  current dividend 
 
 
7. See Fisk et al., supra note 4 (noting that “Bruce Berkowitz, the head of Fairholme 
Capital Management LLC,” and “[h]edge-fund manager Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square 
Capital Management LP” are among those involved in various suits challenging the Third 
Amendment). 
8. The phrase “dividend sweep litigation,” as it appears in this Note, refers 
collectively to the various lawsuits against the federal government in connection with the 
Third Amendment. 
9. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 16. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. ¶¶ 59–94 (enumerating four administrative law grounds on which the court 
should grant relief). 
12. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. 404-79, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as 
codified by An Act to enact Title 5, United States Code, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 
(1996), as amended through Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
13. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 95. 
14. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *2–3 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting HERA’s broad empowering language and the emergency nature of 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis). 
15. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1719, 4511, 4513 & 4617 
(2012)); Vardi, supra note 5. 
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sweep litigation against the Government. Specifically, this Note asserts 
that although Perry and similarly situated plaintiffs bringing APA-based 
actions rightfully question the Government’s reasoning in entering the 
Third Amendment, HERA’s anti-injunction provision16 presents what is 
likely an insurmountable jurisdiction problem for dividend sweep 
litigation plaintiffs. This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a 
general background of the GSEs’ history, role in the secondary 
mortgage market, and path to conservatorship.17  Part III summarizes   
the arguments Perry and other plaintiffs made in district court,18 while 
Part IV discusses why these claims failed in district court and why 
HERA’s anti-injunction provision successfully insulates  the 
Government from virtually all judicial review from  APA-based 
claims.19 Part V concludes by discussing the negative implications of 
insulating the Third Amendment from review by using HERA’s anti- 
injunction provision.20 
II. THE GSES’ ROAD TO CONSERVATORSHIP 
 
 
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie:  A Brief History 
 
The mission of the GSEs is to provide liquidity and stability to 
the mortgage industry by purchasing, guaranteeing, and securitizing 
mortgage loans from loan originators to sell on the secondary market.21 
Fannie Mae was formed in 1938 under U.S. Government charter and 
privatized in 1968.22 Freddie Mac was formed in 1970 under the 
umbrella of the Federal Home Loan Banks and became fully privatized 
in 1989.23 When banks sell long-term mortgages in the  secondary 
market for securitization, the asset (a thirty year fixed rate mortgage, for 
 
 
 
16.    12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. Avni P. Patel, The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 28 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 21, 22 (2009). 
22. Id. 
23. Julie Andersen Hill, Shifting Losses: The Impact of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie 
Mac’s Conservatorships on Commercial Banks, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 343, 350 (2012). 
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example) is converted into cash.24 This sale reduces the  bank’s  
exposure to interest rate and default risks.25 By providing a ready-made 
market for long-term streams of payment, the secondary mortgage 
market increases loan originators’ liquidity and removes the long-term 
interest rate and default risks associated with holding a typical mortgage 
loan to maturity—all of which increase the availability of home 
mortgage loans.26 The GSEs’ role in the U.S. housing market is 
paramount. When the GSEs were put  into  conservatorship  in 
September 2008, they collectively “owned or guaranteed more than $5 
trillion in residential mortgages.”27 
Because of pressure by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) to increase mortgage loan availability for lower- 
income borrowers, the GSEs purchased increasing levels of subprime 
loans made by originators in the years leading up to 2007.28 Once 
subprime mortgage defaults reached a feverish pace in late 2007, private 
investors lost confidence in the GSEs and began to sell GSE stock en 
masse.29 In 2008, Congress passed HERA as a response to the subprime 
mortgage crisis.30 HERA provides the statutory basis for the FHFA to 
place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into either conservatorship or 
receivership.31 According to Perry, “[b]efore the FHFA placed the 
Companies into conservatorship, [the] Treasury . . . encouraged private 
investors to purchase Private Sector Preferred Stock.”32 
 
 
 
24. Patel, supra note 21, at 22–23. 
25. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 329–33 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing how the sale of mortgage loans by 
loan originators to securitizers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac allows banks and other 
loan originators to reduce the risk that market rates paid to depositors might exceed fixed 
rates earned on long-term mortgages). 
26. See Patel, supra note 21, at 22 (noting that “[a]fter banks and other loan originators 
sell mortgages to [the GSEs], they use profits to make new loans,” and that “[these] loans 
increase liquidity and flexibility in the housing market”). 
27. Hill, supra note 23, at 344. 
28. Patel, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that “HUD required [the GSEs] to purchase 
‘affordable’ loans made available to . . . low and middle-income buyers”). 
29.    Id. at 24–25. 
30. Id. at 24; Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The 
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 484–85 (2009). 
31. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1719, 4511, 4513 & 4617 
(2012)). 
32. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 39. 
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B. The GSEs Enter into the Original PSPA 
 
On September 7, 2008, the Treasury exercised its new grant of 
authority to place the GSEs into conservatorship and execute the  
original PSPAs as a means of ensuring their solvency when it deemed 
their recapitalization efforts woefully inadequate.33 As a result,  the 
GSEs have been wards of the state ever since. 
The conservatorships of the GSEs are structured so that the 
FHFA runs the firms in place of their previous executive leadership, and 
negotiates with the Treasury on behalf of the GSEs for the terms of the 
PSPAs.34 The GSEs were given an extension of an initial $100 billion 
(later extended to $200 billion)35 line of credit immediately after they 
were placed into conservatorship under the FHFA.36 This “bailout” of 
sorts was effected through an initial agreement that the Treasury would 
buy all of the newly-created senior preferred stock for a nominal price  
of $1 billion.37 If at any time the FHFA determined that Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac’s liabilities exceed its assets, “[the] Treasury [would] 
contribute cash capital to the GSE in an amount equal to the difference 
between liabilities and assets” and that amount “[would] be added to the 
senior preferred stock.”38 In return for access to this liquidity, the senior 
preferred stock would earn a 10% annual dividend, and the Treasury 
would receive warrants for the purchase of 79.9% of Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac’s common stock at a nominal price.39 In the event Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac was unable to pay the 10% dividend on the value  
of the senior preferred stock, the dividend rate would rise to 12% 
annually which would accrue until the GSE could resume payment of 
the dividend.40 This draw and dividend structure was meant to quickly 
infuse the GSEs with cash and assuage “widespread concern that the 
 
33. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 30, at 486. 
34. Patel, supra note 21, at 25–26. 
35. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *3 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014) (“On May 6, 2009, Treasury and the GSEs, through [the] FHFA . . . doubled 
its funding cap to $200 billion for each GSE.”). 
36. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury 
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- 
releases/Documents/pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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[GSEs] were insolvent.”41 
Conservators are meant “to conduct an institution as an ongoing 
business.”42 As such, Perry argued that the FHFA was required to run 
the GSEs in a manner consistent with securing their future as private 
firms.43 Indeed, Perry argued that the FHFA is “strictly limited by 
HERA” in its role as conservator.44 
 
C. The FHFA and the Treasury Enter into the Third Amendment 
 
Entered into by the FHFA as conservator for the GSEs, and the 
Treasury as holder of the senior preferred stock on August 17, 2012,45 
the Third Amendment was the genesis of the dividend sweep litigation. 
The Third Amendment drastically changed the nature of the 
relationships between the GSEs, the Treasury, and the FHFA by erasing 
the prior 10% dividend of the government preferred stock and instead 
“sweeps” all profits over a certain threshold to the Treasury.46 These 
new dividend payments made to the Treasury are calculated by 
subtracting the “Applicable Capital Reserve Amount”47 from any 
positive net worth generated by the GSEs in each quarter.48 Every net 
worth dollar the GSEs generate above that reserve amount is paid to the 
 
 
41. DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34657, 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INSOLVENCY: FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE 
MAC, AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2 (2008). 
42. Resolution Trust Corp. v. CedarMinn Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 956 F.2d 1446, 1454 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (drawing the distinction between the roles of conservators and receivers). 
43. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 81 (“HERA requires the FHFA to take steps to put 
[the GSEs] in a sound and solvent condition and to work to conserve [their] assets and 
property.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)). 
44. Id. 
45. Third Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. 1, 8 (Aug. 
17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/ 
000119312512359938/d398152dex101.htm. 
46. See id. at 4 (replacing the “Dividend Rate” of 10.0% after December 31, 2012 with 
the “Dividend Amount,” defined as “the amount, if  any,  by  which  the  Net  Worth 
Amount . . . less the Applicable Capital Reserve Amount exceeds zero”). 
47. The “Applicable Capital Reserve Amount” is the amount of capital per quarter that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to retain. This capital reserve amount is 
decreased from $3 billion per quarter in 2013 to $0 by January 1, 2018, such that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to retain a maximum of $12 billion in 2013, $9.6 billion 
in 2014, $7.2 billion in 2015, $4.8 billion in 2016, $2.4 billion in 2017, and $0 beginning in 
2018. Id. 
48. Id. 
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Treasury as a dividend on the existing senior preferred stock.49 Thus,  
the GSEs are barred from building any capital, save the nominal reserve 
amounts,50  and operate as indentured servants to the Treasury. 
The Government’s cited reason for entering into the Third 
Amendment was the growing concern over the “circularity of 
payments”51 death spiral that might ensue when an unprofitable GSE 
would be forced to draw funds from the Treasury to meet the 10% 
interest payments on existing Treasury-held senior preferred stock.52 
This would have the effect of increasing the GSEs’ dividend obligations 
because the draw amount would be added to the liquidation preference 
amount that would accrue interest at 10%.53 According to the Treasury 
and the FHFA, this cycle of paying 10% dividends to the Treasury with 
additional draws from the Treasury had the potential to exhaust the 
Treasury’s lending limit of $200 billion.54 Creating this negative 
feedback loop of borrowing funds from the Treasury to pay the interest 
charges on other Treasury draws could potentially spiral the GSEs into 
insolvency.55 
The Government claimed that the Third Amendment was a 
reasonable way to ensure that neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie  Mac 
could exhaust their access to capital, given that the purpose of  the 
PSPAs was to instill market confidence in the GSEs.56  If the  FHFA 
were to permit Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to exhaust their funding 
commitments, it would send strong market signals that that GSE was in 
a precarious position—unable to turn to the government for any 
additional cash.57    Although that stated concern may seem reasonable, 
 
49. Id. 
50. The reserve amount of capital that the GSEs are permitted to retain, assuming a 
positive net worth is generated, is decreased annually until it reaches $0 in 2018, at which 
point neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac are permitted to retain any positive earnings. Id. 
51. Treasury Defendant’s Reply in Support of Their Dispositive Motions and 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motions at 43, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 
13-1025, (D.D.C. May 2, 2014) [hereinafter Treasury Reply]. 
52. Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 43–47. 
53. Id. at 43. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 44–45 (claiming the Third Amendment was necessary because of “the 
need to maintain investor confidence in the GSEs by minimizing those entities’ draws on the 
finite Treasury funds available to them”). 
56. Id. 
57. See id. (arguing that the Government had a duty to calm and reassure the mortgage- 
backed securities market that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were healthy and that, with this 
chief concern in mind, the Third Amendment was abundantly reasonable). 
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plaintiffs in all dividend sweep litigation cases fundamentally disagree 
about the necessity and legitimacy of the Third Amendment. 
The concerns that the GSEs’ lack of profitability might 
precipitate a negative feedback loop became moot when the two 
mortgage giants returned to consistent profitability in the quarters 
following the  Third Amendment’s  enactment.58     After  drawing a final 
$20 million in the first quarter of 2012, Freddie Mac has paid the 
Treasury approximately $91 billion of the Treasury’s $71 billion 
investment—a return of 128%.59 Fannie Mae has paid the Treasury 
approximately $134.5 billion of the Treasury’s $116.1 billion 
investment—a return of 115%.60 Combined, the GSEs have returned 
approximately $225 billion to the Treasury for the Treasury’s $188 
billion commitment—a return of approximately 119% to the U.S. 
taxpayers.61 Fannie Mae’s news release succinctly sums up the issue: 
“Fannie Mae will have paid a total of $134.5 billion in dividends to  
[the] Treasury in comparison to $116.1 billion in draw requests since 
2008.  Dividend payments do not reduce prior Treasury draws.”62 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, investors in private preferred stock and 
common stock of the GSEs filed a slew of civil actions containing 
various claims against  the Government in 2013.63    Perry’s suit  focused 
 
58. See FREDDIE MAC, UPDATE: INVESTOR PRESENTATION 12–13 (Dec. 2014) 
[hereinafter FREDDIE MAC UPDATE], available at 
http://www.Freddie Macmac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf (showing 
profitable quarters since 3Q12 with zero Treasury draw requests since 1Q12 for 
approximately $20 million); Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Reports Largest Net 
Income in Company History; $17.2 Billion for 2012 and $7.6 Billion for Fourth Quarter 
2012 10 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Fannie Mae Report 4Q12], available at 
http://www.Fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual- 
results/2012/q42012_release.pdf (showing profitable quarters in 3Q and 4Q12, immediately 
following the Third Amendment). 
59. See FREDDIE MAC UPDATE, supra note 58, at 13. 
60. See Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Reports Net Income of $3.9 billion  
and Comprehensive Income $4.0 billion for Third Quarter 2014 1 (Nov. 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter Fannie Mae Report 3Q14], available at http://www.Fanniemae.com/ 
resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2014/q32014_release.pdf. 
61. Freddie Mac’s $91 billion and Fannie Mae’s $134 billion combine to $225 billion. 
Dividing that figure by the government’s total funding commitment of $188 billion yields 
119%. 
62. Fannie Mae Report 3Q14, supra note 60, at 1. 
63. See Fisk et al., supra note 4 (noting that Perry’s suit is “among the first of almost 
20 related cases to be decided”); Press Release, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac Investors File Suit Challenging U.S. Treasury’s 2012 “Sweep Amendment” 
(July 7, 2013) (on file with author) (announcing the filing of a suit against the federal 
government to nullify the Third Amendment as illegal). 
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on the administrative law aspects of the actions of the FHFA and the 
Treasury, arguing that the Third Amendment should be vacated.64 
According to Perry, the administrative agencies essentially abused their 
statutory powers and strayed from HERA’s mandate by extracting 
billions from the mortgage giants before winding them down and 
creating a world without the GSEs.65 
 
D. Parallel Litigation Underway 
 
Although the approximately twenty lawsuits all spring from the 
same set of facts—the enactment of the Third Amendment—groups 
holding stock in the GSEs have taken a number of different approaches 
to attacking the validity of the Third Amendment.66 All combined, the 
lawsuits take five general approaches in respect to their substantive 
claims: (1) administrative law arguments that the Government exceeded 
its statutory authority, (2) administrative law arguments that the 
Government acted arbitrarily and capriciously when entering into the 
Third Amendment, (3) constitutional arguments that the United States 
effected a taking of property from the private preferred and common 
stockholders, (4) breach of contractual agreement, and (5) breach of 
fiduciary duty owed to the private preferred stock and common 
stockholders.67 
 
 
64. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 95. 
65. See Plaintiffs Perry Capital LLC, Fairholme Funds, Inc., Fairholme Fund, Berkley 
Ins. Co., Acadia Ins. Co., Admiral Indem. Co., Admiral Ins. Co., Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co., 
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., Midwest Emp’s Cas. Ins. Co., Nautilus Ins. Co., Preferred Emp’s  
Ins. Co., Arrowood Indem. Co., Arrowood Surplus Lines Ins. Co., and Fin. Structures Ltd. 
Reply in Support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on  Administrative 
Procedure Act Claims at 1–2, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025  (D.D.C.  June 2, 
2014) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply]. 
66. See Todd Sullivan, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac: The WSJ Misinterprets Sweeney 
Decision, VALUEPLAYS (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.valueplays.net/2014/09/24/wsj-misinterprets-sweeney-decision (noting that 
“[t]here is a reason many of these are separate actions, the cases and arguments being made 
are not the same”). Mr. Sullivan correctly notes the dangers in drawing parallels  from  
results in other cases against the government because the nature of the arguments differ 
based on the plaintiff and the particular arguments each makes. Id. 
67. See Consolidated Class Action and Derivative Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Memorandum  
of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class 
Action and Derivative Complaint, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 20–37,  
In Re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action 
Litigations, No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (making arguments based on the common- 
law of contracts, fiduciary duties, and takings claims); Complaint, supra note 5. 
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III. PERRY’S CASE 
 
At the pleading stage of the case in district court, Perry made 
administrative law arguments against the Treasury68 and against the 
FHFA69 in an attempt to invalidate the Third Amendment and revive the 
value of the private preferred stock.70 On September  30,  2014, 
however, the district court ruled in favor of the Government on motions 
to dismiss Perry’s case71 along with lawsuits brought by Fairholme 
Funds,72 Arrowood Indemnity Company,73 and a class of litigants 
represented by Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP74 (collectively, the 
“Plaintiffs”). The four suits made many similar and overlapping 
arguments.75 The dismissal surprised many interested in the litigation, 
because the case was dismissed while the Government was still 
compiling their administrative records, before either party had presented 
oral arguments on motions, before discovery, and before trial.76 
Although the Plaintiffs’ claims in these four cases failed before 
they were advanced at trial, the basic substance of their arguments 
warrants examination as several plaintiffs filed notices of appeal 
immediately following the dismissal.77    These arguments are useful as a 
 
68. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 68, 73 (claiming that the Treasury exceeded its 
statutory authority under HERA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the 
APA). 
69. See id. ¶¶ 87, 94 (claiming that the FHFA violated its statutory mandate to preserve 
and conserve the GSEs and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA). 
70. See id. ¶ 1; Vardi, supra note 15. 
71. Order at 2–3, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014). 
72. Consolidated Amended Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Fairholme Funds, 
Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 13-1053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013). 
73. Complaint, Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No.  13-1439 
(D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013). 
74. Consolidated Amended Class Action and Derivative Compliant, In Re Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigations, No. 
13-1288 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2013). 
75. Order, supra note 71, at 2. Several of the motions and accompanying memoranda 
were written and filed jointly. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, (filing three separate 
actions and case numbers together for the fifty-one page memorandum of law). 
76. See Richard Epstein, The WSJ’s Improbable Defense of Judge Lamberth’s 
Indefensible Decision in Perry Capital, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/10/02/godzilla-versus-the-thing-the-wall- 
street-journals-improbable-defense-of-judge-lamberths-indefensible-decision-in-perry- 
capital. 
77. Joe Light, Fairholme Funds to Appeal Dismissal of Fannie, Freddie Suit, WALL  
ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairholme-funds-to-appeal- 
dismissal-of-fannie-freddie-suit-1412950991 (noting that Fairholme Funds, Inc. and Perry 
Capital, LLC had filed notices of appeal from the District Court’s decision). 
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representative sample of the APA-based dividend sweep litigation 
arguments. 
Perry used a two-pronged approach to attack the Treasury’s 
actions.78 Perry claimed that the Treasury violated the APA by 
exceeding its statutory authority under HERA and that the Treasury 
acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” when it entered into the Third 
Amendment.79 
 
A. The Government Lacked Statutory Authority 
 
Under the APA, a court can “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions” if they are “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction,    authority,  or   limitations.”80 Perry    relied  on   this 
administrative law statute to provide the legal mechanism for 
invalidating the Treasury’s actions, because the Treasury is an agency 
subject to the APA.81 HERA empowers the Treasury to purchase 
securities in the GSEs to make them solvent.82 It also limits the time in 
which the Treasury may purchase those securities or advance them 
additional funds.83 HERA explicitly limits the Treasury’s power to 
“hold, exercise any rights received in connection with, or sell, any 
obligations or securities purchased” after December 31, 2009.84 Perry’s 
argument was simply that by amending the stock certificates through  
the Third Amendment in 2012, the Treasury materially altered the 
securities in such a way that it amounts to a “purchase” of securities 
long after its authority to do so had expired.85 
According to Perry, the Treasury “did not exercise any right”  to 
 
 
78. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 68, 73, 87, 94 (making two APA-based arguments 
against each defendant—that they exceeded their statutory authority, and that they acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously). 
79.    See id.  ¶¶ 64, 68, 73, 78. 
80. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012). 
81. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 68. 
82. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b) 
(2012) (granting the FHFA the authority to “[o]perate the [GSE]” and “provide by contract 
for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, action, or duty of the [FHFA] as  
conservator or receiver.” Id. This provision, when coupled with the FHFA’s mandate to 
conserve the GSE’s assets is the basis on which the FHFA finds authority to contract with 
the Treasury to ensure the GSEs are solvent. 
83.    §§ 1455(l)(4), 1719(g)(4). 
84.    § 1719(g)(2)(D). 
85. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 18–26. 
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which it was entitled under the terms of the PSPAs.86 Perry argued that 
the power to amend the PSPAs was not a “right [the] Treasury received 
that could be exercised after December 31, 2009.”87 In response, the 
Treasury, in essence, argued that the right to amend the PSPAs was a 
contractual right contained in the original PSPAs.88 The Treasury 
claimed that the right to amend the PSPAs survived the expiration of the 
right to purchase securities in the GSEs at the end of 2009.89 In that  
case, the Third Amendment would simply be the exercise of that right 
“received in connection with”90 the original PSPAs.91 Perry responded  
by asserting that the Treasury’s right to amend the PSPAs vanished at 
the stroke of midnight on December 31, 2009, at which point the 
Treasury was left only with whatever stock it had purchased up to that 
date.92 
Perry then asserted that the Treasury changed the nature of the 
stock it owned in the GSEs by executing the total net worth sweep and 
that the “fundamental change” securities law doctrine should render the 
amendment an illegal purchase of securities.93 This doctrine represents 
an exception to the default rule for bringing a securities fraud action 
under § 10(b).94 Under that provision, “a plaintiff [must] be an actual 
‘purchaser’ or ‘seller’ of securities who has been injured by deception  
or fraud ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale.”95 
The fundamental change doctrine provides a cause of action for 
plaintiffs to bring a securities fraud claim when the default rule’s 
technical requirement of a purchase or sale is not met.96  When  a 
plaintiff experiences a drastic and unintentional change in the nature of  
a security, courts will deem the holder of that security to have 
effectively purchased or sold it.97    Perry used this narrow exception to 
 
86. Id. at 18. 
87.    Id. at 18–20. 
88.    Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 28. 
89.    Id. at 27–28. 
90. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D) 
(2012). 
91. See Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 26–29 (arguing that  amending the PSPAs 
was a permissible exercise of rights not subject to the Sunset Provision). 
92. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 19. 
93.    Id. at 20–22. 
94. 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 226 (1994). 
95. Id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952)). 
96. Id. 
97.    Id. at 226–27. 
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define the term “purchase” to establish that the change in the GSEs’ 
stock resulting from the Third Amendment was a “purchase” made after 
the Treasury’s express authority to do so had expired.98 This securities 
law doctrine and a common sense understanding of the word 
“purchase,” Perry argued, means that the Treasury bought rights after its 
authority to do so had expired.99 
Perry also argued that the FHFA, because of its special role as 
the GSEs’ conservator, had a “statutory responsibility to ensure each 
[GSE] ‘operates in a safe and sound manner.’ ”100 The FHFA owed a 
special duty as the GSEs’ conservator to protect and conserve them as 
private, ongoing businesses.101 According to Perry, agreeing  to 
surrender all company net worth was antithetical to the FHFA’s role in 
protecting the GSEs and their shareholders.102 Perry alleged that 
Congress “requires [the] FHFA . . . to preserve and conserve the 
[GSEs’] assets and place [them] in a  sound and solvent condition.”103   
In other words, preventing the companies from retaining or building 
capital could not logically further the goal of reestablishing the GSEs as 
private firms—a goal that necessarily required the GSEs to buy back the 
government preferred shares.104 
 
B. The Government Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously 
 
Perry’s second line of argument comes from the “arbitrary and 
capricious” provision of the APA.105    Pursuant to the APA, a court  may 
 
98. Plaintiff’s Reply, supra note 65, at 22. 
99. Id. at 20. 
100. Id. at 29 (quoting News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, A Strategic Plan for 
Enterprise Conservatorships: The Next Chapter in a Story that Needs an Ending 7 (Feb. 21, 
2012)). 
101. See id. 
102. See id. at 2–3 (claiming that “FHFA’s contentions that the [Third Amendment] is 
consistent with its conservatorship authority . . . fall flat,” and that the Third Amendment 
“renders those goals [of preserving the GSEs assets for normal resumption of business] 
impossible”). 
103. Id. (citing Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 
4617(b)(2)(D) (2012)) (internal quotation omitted). 
104. As part of the original agreement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, new 
“Treasury Senior Preferred Stock” was created to provide the mechanism for funding Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, supra 
note 36. Those shares have an outstanding value of $189.5 billion—an amount that would 
need to be satisfied in order for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repurchase those shares and 
resume normal operations. 
105. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 39. 
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invalidate “agency action, findings, and conclusions” found to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance   with   law.”106 As    articulated    in   Motor   Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.,107 the test for challenging an agency action as “arbitrary and 
capricious” turns on whether the action is the product of “reasoned 
decisionmaking.”108 Although judicial review under this standard is 
deferential to the agency, courts still require that the agency “examine 
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’ ”109 Based on this standard, Perry argued that the Treasury and 
the FHFA “failed to consider factors required by Congress, [] failed to 
take into account the agencies’ prior explanations of their statutory 
authority,” “failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,” and “clearly 
breached their fiduciary duties” in entering into the Third 
Amendment.110 
Perry asserted that the administrative record provided by the 
Treasury does not provide the congressionally required explanation for 
why the Third Amendment was consistent with the plan for the GSEs to 
resume operations as a private entity.111  According to Perry, this lack of 
a record demonstrates that neither the Treasury nor the FHFA  can 
justify the Third Amendment in light of its mandate to revive  and 
release the GSEs.112 
Perry further argued that although “[a]n agency’s predictive 
judgments may be entitled to some deference . . . no deference is owed 
to predictions that are contradicted by the record.”113 Perry’s  claim  
was, again, simple: The data available at the time of the Third 
Amendment clearly showed a healthier future for both of the GSEs, 
rendering the Third Amendment unnecessary for the mortgage giants.114 
 
106. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
107.    463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
108. Id. at 52. 
109. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). 
110. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 39. 
111.    Id. at 39–40. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. (emphasis added) (citing BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 469 F.3d 1052, 
1060 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
114. Id. at 41. 
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The final avenue of argument on the arbitrary and capricious 
theory is that the Treasury, as the majority shareholder in the GSEs, 
breached its fiduciary duty to the private preferred and common 
stockholders by entering into the Third Amendment.115 Independent of 
any contractual-based theory, the Treasury and the FHFA  owed 
fiduciary duties to the private shareholders in the companies the FHFA 
was supposed to be rehabilitating—duties they breached.116 
IV. WHY PERRY LOST AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF HERA’S ANTI- 
INJUNCTION PROVISION 
 
Perry’s claims failed in district court for one reason: HERA’s 
anti-injunction provision, contained in 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f), bars judicial 
review of any action that “restrain[s] or affect[s]”117 the FHFA in 
conserving the assets of the GSEs, as long as it acts within its statutory 
authority.118 To escape that provision’s reach and expose the 
Government to judicial review requires evidence that the Government 
exceeded its statutory authority.119 
The district court found that HERA clearly grants broad powers 
to the FHFA to act in furtherance of its conservator objectives,120 and 
that HERA’s anti-injunction provision prevents judicial review of all 
equitable claims against the FHFA when acting pursuant to its  statutory 
 
 
115. See id. at 46–48. 
116. Memorandum of Law of Plaintiffs Perry Capital LLC, Fairholme Funds, Inc., 
Fairholme Fund, Berkley Ins. Co., Acadia Ins. Co., Admiral Indem. Co., Admiral Ins. Co., 
Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co., Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., Midwest Emp’s Cas. Ins. Co., Nautilus Ins. 
Co., Preferred Emp’s Ins. Co., Arrowood Indem. Co., Arrowood Surplus Lines Ins. Co., and 
Fin. Structures Ltd. in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Motions for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Administrative Procedure Act Claims at 85–88, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014). 
117. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) 
(2012). 
118. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014) (explaining that twenty-four of the thirty-seven claims brought by the five 
groups of litigants seek a type of relief that is effectively barred). 
119. See id. at *6, 8 (explaining that dismissal is proper if the plaintiffs fail to 
“sufficiently plead that the FHFA acted beyond the scope of its statutory [authority]” as 
conservator which would require a purchase of securities). 
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(1)(D) (stating that “[the FHFA] may, as conservator, take 
action as may be—(i) necessary to put the [GSE] in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) 
appropriate to carry on the business of the [GSE] and preserve the assets and property of the 
[GSE]”). 
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authority.121 In addition to the broad protections for the FHFA from 
judicial review of “the exercise of [its] powers or functions . . . as a 
conservator,”122 the Treasury’s authority is afforded the protections of 
the anti-injunction provision because “granting relief against the 
counterparty to a contract with [the] FHFA would directly restrain [the] 
FHFA’s ability as a conservator vis-à-vis that contract.”123 In short, the 
court’s principal inquiry is whether the Government was acting within 
its statutory authority.124 If so, then HERA’s anti-injunction provision 
bars all claims seeking non-monetary relief.125 
 
A. The District Court’s Dismissal 
 
In the court’s memorandum opinion supporting the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ cases, Judge Lamberth details the pertinent background 
information for the cases, the applicable legal standard on a motion to 
dismiss, and the analysis for why the various plaintiffs’ claims failed.126 
In a few short pages,127 Judge Lamberth found that HERA’s anti- 
injunction provision: “bars claims of arbitrary and capricious 
conduct,”128 and “applies to Treasury’s authority.”129 He further found 
that the “Treasury . . . did not violate [its] authority” under HERA,130 
and that the “FHFA acted within its statutory authority.”131 
HERA’s anti-injunction provision states in pertinent part, “no 
court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or 
 
 
 
121.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6. 
122.    12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). 
123. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7 (citing Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 12–13). 
124. Id. at *6 (citing previous D.C. Circuit decisions on agency review and noting that 
“the question for this Court is whether the plaintiffs sufficiently plead that [the Government] 
acted beyond the scope of its ‘statutory powers or functions’ ”); Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. FHFA, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that “the critical question” 
in determining if § 4617(f) “precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction” is “whether 
the FHFA’s [action] constitutes an exercise of a conservatorship power or function”). 
125. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (noting that a failure to plead that the Government 
exceeded its powers, “the Court must dismiss all of the [plaintiffs’] claims for declaratory, 
injunctive, or other equitable relief”). 
126.    Id. at *1–25. 
127.    Id. at *7–12. 
128. Id. at *7. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at *9. 
131. Id. 
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functions of [the FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.”132  Because  
case law on HERA’s anti-injunction provision is admittedly “sparse,”133 
courts have looked to a “nearly identical jurisdictional bar”134 contained 
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (“FIRREA”)135 for guidance.136 FIRREA’s anti-injunction 
provision, contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), applies to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and prevents judicial review  
of the FDIC’s action as a conservator.137 This usage of FIRREA’s anti- 
injunction provision to inform HERA’s anti-injunction provision spells 
disaster for Perry and other plaintiffs who seek equitable relief from the 
Third Amendment.138 
In the midst of the savings and loan crisis, Congress passed 
FIRREA, amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 
(“FDIA”)139 to strengthen the FDIC’s authority to put troubled financial 
institutions into conservatorship or receivership and to repudiate 
contracts entered into by those depository institutions.140 In Freeman v. 
FDIC,141 the D.C. Circuit found that the language of FIRREA’s 
injunction bar “does indeed effect a sweeping ouster of courts’ power to 
grant equitable remedies.”142 FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision bars 
judicial review as long as the FDIC acts within its statutorily permitted 
role as conservator or receiver.143 The D.C. Circuit read FIRREA’s anti-
injunction  provision  as  barring  any  court  from  granting  non- 
 
132. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) 
(2012). 
133.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6. 
134. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FHFA, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (referencing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (2012)). 
135. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); 
Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6. 
136. Natural Res. Def. Council, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
137.    Id. at 641–42. 
138. See Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7 (“Counts in each of the Perry, Fairholme, and 
Arrowood Complaints, and related prayers for relief, that claim APA violations for arbitrary 
and capricious conduct . . . are hereby dismissed.”). 
139. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (FDIA), Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835a (2012)). 
140. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 n.12 (discussing FIRREA’s enactment and the 
“congressional intent to grant the FDIC enormous discretion to act as conservator or  
receiver during the savings and loan crisis”). 
141.    56 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
142.    Id. at 1399. 
143.   Id. 
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monetary remedies that would impede the FDIC in fulfilling its mandate 
to wind up (as receiver) hundreds of insolvent savings associations.144 
Referencing the Freeman opinion, Judge Lamberth notes that 
the congressional intent behind FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision was 
to allow the speedy resolution or “wind up” of hundreds of failed thrifts 
with   minimal   interruption.145 Using   FIRREA’s   anti-injunction 
provision from Freeman as the controlling standard, Judge Lamberth 
determined that “the plaintiffs [did not] sufficiently plead that [the] 
FHFA acted beyond the scope of its statutory powers or functions . . . as 
conservator.”146 In the court’s view, the Third Amendment was merely 
another conservator action that falls within the “extraordinary breadth of 
HERA’s statutory grant to [the] FHFA.”147 
The court found that because the FHFA acted within its 
statutory authority to solve the circularity of payments problem, 
discussed earlier,148 the manner in which the FHFA addressed that 
problem is barred from judicial review.149 That conclusion left only one 
question for the court to resolve: Whether the Third Amendment 
Treasury was statutorily impermissible purchase of securities, and not 
the permissible exercise of an existing contractual right.150 
 
1. The FHFA Did Not Exceed its Statutory Authority 
 
To evade HERA’s anti-injunction provision’s bar on inquiry  
into the reasonableness of the Third Amendment, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the Government acted in some way outside of its 
statutory authority.151 Otherwise, the APA-based claims praying for 
declaratory and equitable relief that plaintiffs rely on are barred because 
they would “restrain or affect” the FHFA’s statutory powers to run the 
 
 
 
144.   Id. 
145.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 n.12. 
146. Id. at *6. 
147. Id. at *9. 
148. See supra Part II.C. 
149. See Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *9 (noting that HERA’s broad grant of power to 
the FHFA, “coupled with the anti-injunction provision, narrows the Court’s jurisdictional 
analysis to what the Third Amendment entails, rather than why [the] FHFA executed [it]”) 
(emphasis in original). 
150.    Id. at *7–8. 
151.    Id. at *6, 8. 
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GSEs.152 The reason HERA’s anti-injunction provision is such a  
problem for plaintiffs is that the crux of the argument against the FHFA 
is that the decision to enter into the Third Amendment was based on 
concerns other than legitimate conservator duties.153 The real reason for 
the Third Amendment, Perry claimed, was to begin the GSEs’ own  
death spiral and prevent them from reentering the private sector.154 To 
reach that argument, however, plaintiffs have to show that the FHFA  
did not have the authority to make that decision under HERA.155 The 
argument that the FHFA acted outside the power it was given as a 
conservator is exceedingly difficult, given the broad terms in which 
HERA grants power to the FHFA.156 
Some agency decisions may be reached arbitrarily and 
capriciously while remaining within the bounds of what the agency was 
permitted to pass judgment on pursuant to  its statutory authority.157  
This is because, as the district court noted, the limit of an agency’s 
statutory authority is not necessarily congruent to the standard of 
finding an agency decision arbitrary and capricious.158 As long as the 
FHFA can demonstrate that changing the dividend structure for the 
GSEs’ payments to the Treasury was within its power to do, it matters 
not how they went about doing it.159 This means that the FHFA is 
permitted to escape review of what may well be arbitrary and capricious 
decisions about the future of the GSEs—simply because it had  the 
power  to  make  that  decision.160     This  creates  an  unreasonably thick 
 
 
152. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) 
(2012). Any non-monetary relief sought—such as the nullification of a contract amendment 
and an unwinding of the dividend structure—is action that would affect the conservator. 
Opinion, supra note 3, at 12 (citing Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394, 1399 (1995)). The 
District Court read FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision to be essentially identical to the 
intent behind preventing non-monetary claims from interfering with the FHFA as 
conservator. Id. 
153. See Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 1 (claiming that statements made in 2012 
“reveal a very different rationale for the [Third Amendment]”). 
154. See id. (quoting Government press releases on the plan to “wind up” the GSEs). 
155.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *9–10. 
156. See id. (drawing the distinction between questioning the reasoning underlying the 
Third Amendment and questioning whether the FHFA had the authority to enact it). 
157. Id. at *7. The District Court opinion maintained that the D.C. Circuit, “implicitly 
draws a distinction between acting beyond the scope of the constitution or a statute . . . and 
acting within the scope of a statute, but doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.” Id. 
158. Id. 
159.    Id. at *9–10. 
160. Id. 
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layer of insulation for the FHFA from judicial review. 
The FHFA will escape judicial review of its questionable 
reasoning for the Third Amendment because in order to review that 
reasoning, the plaintiffs are required to plead that the FHFA was not 
permitted to consider any such action.161 To be sure, there are colorable 
arguments that the FHFA knew the GSEs had a positive financial 
outlook when the Third Amendment was enacted, and that they were  
not at risk, immediate or otherwise, of exhausting their funding 
commitments.162 To raise those issues, however, plaintiffs have to 
demonstrate far more evidence than would be required for proving that 
this action was arbitrary and capricious. 
 
2.  The Treasury Did Not Exceed its Statutory Authority 
 
In order to evade HERA’s anti-injunction provision, the 
Plaintiffs had to assert, as with their claims against the FHFA, that the 
Treasury acted outside “the scope of its authority”163 by agreeing to the 
Third Amendment. As was detailed earlier164 and discussed below, this 
required Perry to advance two highly technical arguments in district 
court that the Treasury exceeded its statutory authority.165 First, that the 
Third Amendment was not the exercise of a contract right to which it 
was entitled after December 31, 2009, and second, that the Third 
Amendment was a purchase of securities in direct violation of 12 U.S.C. 
§   1455(l)(4),   1719(g)   (HERA’s   “Sunset   Provisions”).166 Judge 
Lamberth found neither argument persuasive.167 
Lamberth first addressed the argument that the Third 
Amendment was not a permissible “exercise of rights” in connection 
 
161. Id. at *6. 
162. At the time the Third Amendment was entered into, Fannie Mae was regularly 
meeting the 10% dividend obligation and had over $117 billion of remaining credit it was 
able to draw from the Treasury. Fannie Mae Report 4Q12, supra note 58, at 2 (listing the 
amount of remaining funding available at $117.6 billion). Likewise, Freddie  Mac  had 
drawn a mere $71 billion at the time of the Third Amendment—a far cry from the “death 
spiral” the FHFA was supposedly so concerned about. Freddie Mac Update, supra note 58, 
at 13. 
163.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7–9. 
164. See supra Part III. 
165. See infra Part III.A.1. 
166. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(4), 
1719(g) (2012). 
167.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *8–9. 
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with the existing preferred stock.168 A central premise in the argument 
that the Third Amendment was a purchase of new securities is that the 
Third Amendment was not an exercise of permissible contractual rights 
inherent in the senior preferred stock that could be exercised after 
December 31, 2009.169 HERA allows for the exercise of any right in 
connection with the securities after December 31, 2009, as long as it is 
not a purchase of additional senior preferred stock securities.170  The   
two points are discrete, but interrelated. According to Lamberth, 
however, the plaintiffs read the Sunset Provisions too narrowly.171 That 
provision specifically exempts the holding or selling of the senior 
preferred stock, and would also prevent the FHFA from exercising “any 
provision within [the] Treasury’s contracts with the GSEs that requires 
mutual assent,” according to Lamberth.172 In other words, the argument 
went too far in asserting that the Sunset Provision would prevent any 
and all activity requiring mutual assent.173 
Predictably, Judge Lamberth was also unconvinced that the 
Third Amendment can constitute a “purchase” of new securities.174 
Using a plain language approach to the word “purchase,” Lamberth 
found it determinative that the Treasury did not “grant[] the GSEs 
additional funding commitments nor [did the Treasury] receive[] an 
increased liquidation preference.”175 The telltale signs of a purchase 
were absent, the determinative sign being consideration evidencing an 
exchange.176 While the opinion makes passing reference to Perry’s 
fundamental change doctrine arguments, the issue “strikes the Court as 
straightforward” that there was no “purchase” of securities.177 
 
168. Id. at *8. 
169. See Plaintiff’s Reply, supra note 65, at 18 (arguing that the Third Amendment was 
not an exercise of a contractual right to which the Treasury was entitled after December 31, 
2009). This argument is important for the plaintiffs because if the amendment was simply 
the exercise of a right stemming from the stock purchase agreements, which are contracts, 
HERA would not bar the exercise of those rights since that would be permissible. 
170.    12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D). 
171.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *8. 
172.    Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
173.    Id. at *8–9. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at *9. 
176. See id. (noting that, aside from the complex arguments over the term “purchase,” 
the fact that the Treasury did not “provide[] an additional funding commitment or receiv[e] 
new securities from the GSEs as consideration” is further reason to disfavor finding a 
purchase). 
177. Id. 
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Because the preliminary question of whether the Treasury acted 
within its statutory authority to “exercise any right received in 
connection with the PSPAs”178 is answered in the affirmative, the 
manner in which it exercised that authority becomes irrelevant and 
barred from review by the protections of HERA’s anti-injunction 
provision.179 Thus, although the Treasury is not the conservator of the 
GSEs, any judicial review of the substantive claims on how it acted in 
connection with the GSEs’ conservatorship is barred.180 
 
B. Implications of HERA’s Anti-Injunction Provision 
 
The FHFA and the Treasury have found too thick a layer of 
insulation from judicial review in HERA’s anti-injunction provision. 
That provision effectively insulates the Government from any review of 
its actions when the FHFA invokes its conservator authority, and when 
the review of the Treasury actions affect the FHFA as conservator in 
any way.181 This is unfortunate for the Plaintiffs because many of the 
strongest factual arguments that the FHFA and the Treasury acted 
improperly, arbitrarily and capriciously, and to the detriment of private 
shareholders182 may never be aired. A jurisdictional bar enacted to 
“enable the FDIC and [RTC] to expeditiously wind up the affairs of 
literally hundreds of failed financial institutions,”183 should not have the 
same application and effect in the context of a previously private, but 
now de facto state-run financial institution that shows no signs of being 
wound up, “expeditiously” or otherwise.184 It is, however, ultimately 
Congress who failed to incorporate more vigorous judicial review of the 
FHFA’s actions—possibly because they never envisioned a never- 
ending conservatorship of the GSEs and expected the conservatorship to 
accomplish the fundamental goal of a “ ‘resumption of normal business 
 
 
178. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D) 
(2012). 
179.    Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7–9. 
180.    Id. at *7. 
181.    Id. at *7–8. 
182. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 58–94 (making various factual allegations that the 
FHFA was motivated by concerns other than its duties as the GSEs’ conservator). 
183. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (alteration in original). 
184. The GSEs have been in conservatorship since September 2008 and will likely 
remain wards of the state until GSE reform measures at the Congressional level dictate their 
future. 
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operations.’ ”185 
The immediate effect of this result for the Plaintiffs is 
measurable. Many investors in GSE stock, especially common 
stockholders, were smaller community banks and pension funds.186 
Market reactions to Judge Lamberth’s ruling are powerful indicators of 
what shareholders stand to lose if their bid to nullify the Third 
Amendment is ultimately unsuccessful. The day after the cases were 
dismissed, preferred shares in the GSEs with an approximately $33 
billion face-value lost over 50% of their value, while common shares of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped 37% and 38%, respectively.187 
The favorable regulatory treatment (and categorization as Tier 1 capital) 
of investments in GSE securities induced many investors seeking stable 
and safe stocks to choose GSE common and preferred shares.188 
Consequently, although sophisticated financiers like Perry may be 
assuming the mantle for investors in GSE stock, a negative result could 
have a drastic effect on smaller regional and community institutions. 
As is often the case with litigation involving federal agencies 
and great recession bailouts, opinions are mixed on whether the 
dismissal is the proper and just outcome.189 Although some maintain  
that “[t]he investors may have no better luck on appeal,”190 others 
believe  that the  dismissal was  a  “misguided  blockbuster,”191  and that 
 
185. Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 2 (citation omitted). 
186. See Investor Rights, INVESTORS UNITE, http://investorsunite.org/the-issues/investor- 
rights. 
187. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Perry Capital Appeals Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Bailout 
Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-02/perry-capital-appeals-Fannie Mae-Freddie 
Mac-bailout-ruling.html. 
188. See id.  (citing Press Release,  U.S.  Treasury Dep’t  Office  of Pub.  Affairs, supra 
note 36). 
189. See Richard Epstein, The WSJ’s Improbable Defense of Judge Lamberth’s 
Indefensible Decision in Perry Capital, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/10/02/godzilla-versus-the-thing-the-wall- 
street-journals-improbable-defense-of-judge-lamberths-indefensible-decision-in-perry- 
capital (arguing that the decision was wrong and that the Wall Street Journal misinterpreted 
the ruling and its precedential value). But see Godzilla Defeats the Thing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
2, 2014, 6:51 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/godzilla-defeats-the-thing-1412204855 (recounting the 
decision and arguing that it represents a blow to other plaintiffs and is a victory for U.S. 
taxpayers). 
190. Fisk, supra note 187 (quoting Professor Peter Henning, Wayne State University). 
191. Richard Epstein, Will Fannie and Freddie Shareholders Be Able to Set Aside the 
Third Amendment? Judge Royce Lamberth’s Indefensible Decision Is Only One Battle in a 
Long War, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 4:59 PM), 
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“[p]ortions of Lamberth’s decision may be vulnerable on appeal.”192 
Appealing the district court’s ruling will be “a lengthy process,”193 but 
upholding the Third Amendment by way of an unreasonably high 
jurisdictional bar will have far-reaching negative implications for the 
rule of law.194 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As Perry’s dismissal in district court demonstrated, HERA’s 
anti-injunction provision is a crucial threshold in the analysis of claims 
brought against the Government under the APA.195 While Judge 
Lamberth’s interpretation of HERA’s anti-injunction provision appears 
infallible, it may not be decisive.196 Judge Sweeney, presiding over 
dividend sweep litigation in the Court of Federal Claims has continued 
to grant discovery requests made by the plaintiffs while the case moves 
closer to trial.197 Judge Sweeney, citing the same cases and reasoning as 
Judge Lamberth, seems more able to envision a scenario in which 
HERA’s anti-injunction provision does not bar those plaintiffs’ 
claims.198 Although the final outcome of dividend sweep litigation is 
anyone’s call, it is apparent that plaintiffs bringing APA-based HERA 
challenges of Government action in the future have a virtually 
insurmountable task of clearing the HERA’s anti-injunction provision’s 
bar on judicial review. 
As unfair as it may seem, Perry and the myriad other investors 
who felt assured that buying Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock was a 
 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/09/30/will-fannie-and-freddie- 
shareholders-be-able-to-set-aside-the-third-amendment-the-recent-sweeney-decision-will- 
not-alter-the-basic-dynamics. 
192. Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Fannie-Freddie Investors Fight on in Court of Claims, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2014, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-03/fannie-freddie-investors-fight-on-in- 
court-of-claims (attributing the statement to Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon, University 
of California at Berkeley School of Law). 
193. Id. (quoting Bruce Berkowitz of Fairholme Capital Management LLC). 
194. Epstein, supra note 189. 
195. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014) (dismissing over half of the plaintiff’s claims as barred categorically by the 
anti-injunction provision). 
196. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 365, 367 (2014). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 367 (“[B]lanket assertions concerning the court’s ability to conduct these 
proceedings . . . hold no merit.”). 
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safe investment199 are unlikely to prevail against the government on 
appeal with APA-based claims. This is not because Perry and other 
dividend sweep litigation plaintiffs have meritless cases.200 It is the 
overly broad anti-injunction provision that will likely prevent judicial 
review of the best substantive arguments available to dividend sweep 
litigants bringing claims under the APA.201 
Dividend sweep litigation may hold additional implications for 
federal administrative agency powers, especially in the context of 
conservatorships. If the FHFA, as conservator, can exercise  the  
broadest discretion in running the GSEs—surrendering all positive net 
worth to the Treasury while purporting to “conserve their assets,” then 
the definitional distinctions between conservators and receivers would 
vanish.202 The FHFA, in abdication of its duties as conservator of the 
GSEs, ensured that they would never retain their earnings, build capital, 
or leave the clutches of its conservatorship—except by receivership or 
an act of Congress.203 By claiming the Third Amendment necessary to 
avoid insolvency, the FHFA seems to have ensured that the GSEs will 
never escape conservatorship, and will continue to operate as a cash- 
cow for the federal government.204 If allowed to evade real judicial 
scrutiny, agencies acting as conservators might be allowed free-reign to 
operate companies in conservatorship—altering deals as it pleases. 
 
199. The government admitted as much in the press release regarding the need for the 
initial senior preferred stock purchase agreement. “Investors have purchased securities of 
[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] in part because the ambiguities in their Congressional 
charters created a perception of government backing.” Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t 
Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 36. 
200. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
201. See supra Part IV.B. 
202. See Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 3 (“[The] FHFA’s argument that it may ‘wind 
down’ the [GSEs] in preparation for liquidation collapses any distinction between receivers 
and conservators.”). 
203. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, Treasury Department 
Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and  Freddie Mac (Aug. 
17, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx 
(promising that “every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be 
used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in those firms . . . and [Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac] will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, [or] return to the market  
in their prior form”). 
204. The Third Amendment ensured that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s return to 
profitability would benefit taxpayers at the expense of the private shareholders in Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. Conservators are charged with nursing troubled firms back to health 
and return them to private enterprise, to the extent possible. The FHFA ensured that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac could never satisfy its obligations to the Treasury and return to the 
private sector. 
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This result is unacceptable in the financial world. Predictability 
and adherence to statutory mandates and intent must be favored if 
governmental intervention in the private sector is to persist. Investors 
must be able to reasonably predict the ramifications of governmental 
intervention in private enterprise. A conservator who is allowed to 
exercise such boundless power to shape a private company’s destiny at 
whim will begin to look less like the noble savior Anakin Skywalker  
and more like Darth Vader. 
 
JOSEPH W. SILVA 
